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Evolution
or Revolution?
After the worst recession since the
Second World War, the problem of
unemployment is perhaps the biggest
challenge facing policy-makers. So far
the extent of UK job losses has not
been as bad as expected based on the
experience of the previous three
recessions. But many fear that
unemployment will rise further,
especially as the public spending cuts
take effect. For those without a job for
extended periods, there is a risk of
permanent ‘scarring’, especially for
young people without prior work
experience.
So it is particularly timely that the
2010 Nobel prize in economics has been
awarded for research that explains the
process of search: how people look for
work; how they are matched with job
vacancies; and how various ‘frictions’
impede that outcome.
One of the three new laureates 
is the first economist based in Britain 
to receive the accolade in over a
decade: Chris Pissarides, who has 
been a cornerstone of life at the Centre
for Economic Performance (CEP) since
its foundation in 1990 and for many
years led the research programme on
macroeconomics, particularly
unemployment.
Professor Pissarides explains his
work thus: ‘Our research looks at what
happens to someone who loses his or
her job because of changes in the
economic environment. We have
created a model that allows us to
analyse the processes and decisions,
such as policy, which affect how long it
is before someone finds productive
employment again.’
This research has immediate
implications for policy-makers at a time
of economic weakness: ‘One of the key
things we find is that it is important to
make sure that people do not stay
unemployed too long so they don’t lose
their feel for the labour force. The ways
of dealing with this need not be
expensive training – it could be as
simple as providing work experience.’ 
There’ll be more on what the 
Nobel citation describes as ‘analysis of
markets with search frictions’ in the
next CentrePiece. Meanwhile, this issue
examines many other current policy
debates. A piece on the recent LSE
report on The Future of Finance
summarises its radical proposals for
regulatory reform. And articles on the
NHS White Paper and ‘coalition
academies’ launch a series that will
draw on CEP research to evaluate policy
innovations by the new government.
Elsewhere, we report studies of the
impact of China’s rise on Western
innovation; of the impact of new
technology on demand for skills; and of
the impact of the euro on trade within
the European Union. Perhaps the most
topical for the UK is a cross-country
analysis of the effectiveness of fiscal
policy. As the cuts to public spending
start to be implemented, the key
question is what will be the ultimate
effects on growth and jobs.
Romesh Vaitilingam
Editor
romesh@vaitilingam.com
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T
win spectres are haunting
Europe and the United
States: the growing
economic power of China;
and fears about where the
West’s own growth will come from after
the crisis. But our research suggests that
the dramatic rise in Chinese exports is
actually good news for our economic
prospects, encouraging the best firms in
the developed world to get even better
and to make the innovations that will
power growth in the future.
Take footwear, a classic low-tech
sector that conventional wisdom says
should have all been offshored to China.
Many Western shoe manufacturers have
disappeared, but some are innovating in
designs that serve parts of the market
where China is less able
to compete.
For example, Massai Barefoot
Technology (MBT), which makes posture-
correcting shoes, began when Karl Muller,
a Swiss engineer with a bad back, relieved
his condition through walking barefoot on
Korean grass. He patented a design to
emulate the effect, which has gone on to
great success and now attracts many
imitators.
Companies that can find a niche for
high-end style or technology can prosper
What impact is the rise of China having on
technological change in the West? To answer
this question, John Van Reenen and colleagues
have tracked the innovation and productivity
performance of more than half a million
manufacturing firms in 12 European countries
over a decade.
Chinese ghosts 
in the Western machine 
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in the face of stiff competition. Vermont-
based Burton is a leading snowboard
manufacturer, but also successfully designs
and produces sportswear clothing. This
year, Burton is offshoring the production
of snowboards not to China, but to
Innsbruck, Austria. 
Firms like MBT and Burton have
responded to the threat of China by
investing in new technology and staff
training, and by innovating in highly
customised designs. Why were so few
firms doing this already? The answer is
that enjoying the easy life producing old
goods is more attractive than coming up
with new ones. But a big shock like China
makes innovation relatively cheaper than
continuing with business as usual. 
That shock first hit when China joined
the World Trade Organization in 2001 and
quotas on many Chinese goods were
reduced substantially. This led to a huge
surge in imports and a battle between
retailers and manufacturers as the latter
succeeded in getting some quotas
reinstated. Former European Union trade
commissioner Peter Mandelson was in the
thick of these ‘bra wars’ in 2005, as
Chinese-made clothing – notably women’s
underwear – piled up in European ports. 
These events provide natural
experiments for examining the effect of
Chinese competition, an opportunity that
the CEP has taken. In the largest ever
study of the impact of China on Western
technological change, we track the
performance of more than half a million
manufacturing firms in 12 European
countries over the past decade.
A startling finding is that 15% of
technical change in Europe can be
attributed directly to competition from
Chinese imports, an annual benefit of
almost €10 billion to European countries.
Firms have responded to the threat of
Chinese imports by increasing their
productivity through adopting better
information technology, higher spending
on research and development, and
increased patenting.
But not all firms have seized the
opportunity. Inefficient low-tech firms have
been much more likely to shed jobs and
disappear. This in itself raises productivity
through the brutal force of natural
selection as economic activity is
reallocated away from inefficient
enterprises to their more nimble-footed
competitors. About a third of the overall
effect of Chinese competition occurs in
the form of this ‘creative destruction’.
The job losses for some firms explain
the political resistance to trade and why
pressure is mounting to ‘do something’.
The announcement of another massive
China trade surplus in August during an
otherwise tepid global recovery has added
to these fears.
But doling out export subsidies,
threatening to label China a ‘currency
manipulator’ or erecting trade barriers
(such as President Obama’s 35% tariffs on
tyres last year) to protect the business and
labour lobbies that are losing out are
precisely the wrong way to go. Such
measures will merely delay restructuring,
drive up domestic prices and encourage
industries to invest more in lobbying than
innovation. 
Openness improves overall prosperity,
but the worry is that the burden of
adjustment falls more heavily on the poor
than the rich. Standard economic theory
puts this down to increased pressure on
the wages and jobs of unskilled workers
who are now competing with workers in
Beijing rather than just Birmingham.
Previous research on this ‘Heckscher-
Ohlin trade effect’ suggests that it has
been pretty small. Our data show that a
greater cause for concern is that there will
be a fall in demand for the less educated
because of a China-induced acceleration
of technical change. The appropriate
policy response is not Luddism, but
increasing human capital through
education and training, and easing the
transition of displaced workers across jobs.
There are additional benefits of
Chinese trade to those that increase the
innovation rate of Western firms. For
example, consumers have enjoyed lower
prices. Bigger export markets have spurred
investment. And offshoring has enabled
devices such as the iPod – produced in
China but designed in Silicon Valley – to
be created, because without the
availability of cheap manufacturing many
of these devices would never have been
developed. 
China’s rise is undoubtedly a political
challenge. But trying to keep China down
by freezing it out of the world trading
system would surely have been more
politically dangerous than keeping 
China engaged and thus aligning its
economic incentives with those of the
developed world.
The Chinese have a saying about
haunting spectres: ‘If you believe it, there
will be, but if you don’t, there will not’. If
Europe and the United States continue to
encourage belief in the danger of Chinese
trade to their own economies and try to
weaken China through trade barriers, the
spectre of China will not disappear. On the
contrary, the West’s own growth will be
enfeebled – and that would be
unwelcome even in good times.
This article summarises ‘Trade Induced
Technical Change: The Impact of Chinese
Imports on Innovation and Productivity’ by
Nick Bloom, Mirko Draca and John Van
Reenen, a forthcoming CEP Discussion Paper.
Nick Bloom is an assistant professor of
economics at Stanford University and a CEP
research associate. Mirko Draca is a research
economist in CEP’s productivity and
innovation programme. John Van Reenen is
director of CEP and of its productivity and
innovation programme.
Chinese imports
boost the
European
economy by
almost €10
billion a year
through
stimulating
innovation
The dramatic
rise in China’s
exports is good
news for the
West’s economic
prospects
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I
n the months following the
acquisition of Cadbury by Kraft,
trade unions, business lobby
groups and even the business
secretary Vince Cable have called
for tougher rules on foreign takeovers of
British companies. Part of the argument
centres on whether multinational
corporations like Kraft are less likely than
British owners to invest in the UK and to
preserve British jobs.
Leaving aside the question of whether
Cadbury can accurately be described as
British (80% of its sales were outside the
UK and around half its shares were owned
by North American investors), it is hard to
see why Kraft should not have as strong
an incentive as any other owner to make
the best possible use of the assets it was
buying, including the British plants and
the Cadbury brand. Kraft may or may not
make a success of the takeover, but does
its foreignness make any difference to the
outcome?
Some light can be shed on this issue
by looking at a foreign takeover that took
place 12 years ago – a long enough
period for the consequences, in terms of
jobs and investment, to be assessed with
some degree of accuracy. This was the
purchase of Courtaulds – like Cadbury, a
long-established British company with a
distinguished history – by Akzo Nobel of
the Netherlands in 1998. 
At the time of the takeover,
Courtaulds had two main businesses:
man-made fibres, which had been the
core of the company for nearly 100 years;
and paints, which had been built up by a
series of acquisitions since the 1960s. For
Akzo Nobel, the main attraction of
Courtaulds was its paints division. Thanks
largely to the investment that Courtaulds
had made in Asia, it had geographical and
product strengths that the Dutch company
lacked. The acquisition would consolidate
Akzo Nobel’s position as one of the
world’s leading paint manufacturers.
Akzo Nobel also had a man-made
fibres business, but it was performing
poorly and CEO Cees van Lede had been
trying to sell it. Van Lede believed that if
the two companies’ fibres divisions were
put together, the enlarged business would
be easier to sell, perhaps through a public
flotation or to a trade buyer. Not long
after the takeover, van Lede did find a
buyer in the form of CVC, a private equity
firm that specialised in taking over mature
businesses, improving them and selling
them on. 
So what has happened to Courtaulds’
British plants and the British jobs they
provided? In paints, there is not much
doubt that Courtaulds’ main production
and development facility, at Felling near
Gateshead in the north east of England,
has benefited from being part of Akzo
Nobel.
Courtaulds had been a diversified
group, and the paints division had to
compete for new investment against other
unrelated subsidiaries. Akzo Nobel now
derives two thirds of its sales from paints
(the other third is in speciality chemicals)
and is totally committed to world
leadership in this industry. The ex-
Courtaulds paints business, mainly marine
and industrial coatings, forms an integral
part of the group, and investment in
Felling has increased. 
Since the US company Kraft Foods acquired
Cadbury earlier this year, there has been much
debate about whether foreign takeovers of this
kind are good or bad for the British economy.
A new book by Geoffrey Owen sheds light on
this debate by looking at what happened after
the acquisition of Courtaulds over a decade ago.
Foreign takeovers 
of British companies:
the experience of Courtaulds
There is no
reason to
suppose that 
a foreign
takeover will put
British factories
and British jobs
at risk
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The fibres side is a more complicated
story, since CVC chose not to keep the
combined Akzo/Courtaulds fibres business
as a single entity, as had been Akzo
Nobel’s original intention, but to sell the
component parts piecemeal. In a disposal
process that lasted from 2000 to 2008,
most of the viable fibre plants went to
trade buyers that had a strong commercial
interest in the businesses they were
acquiring and, for the most part, have
continued to invest in them.
This is particularly true of the new
cellulosic fibre, known as Tencel, which
was seen at the time of the Akzo Nobel
takeover as the jewel in Courtaulds’ fibres
portfolio. Tencel was bought by the
Austrian company Lenzing, which is now
Europe’s largest man-made fibres
producer. Lenzing has continued to invest
in the ex-Courtaulds Tencel plants at
Grimsby in the UK and Mobile in
Alabama, and the fibre is now well
established in the market.
Would these outcomes have been
different if Courtaulds had remained a
British company? Here, there is an
important difference with the case of
Cadbury. By the end of 1997, it had
become clear that Courtaulds was
probably not viable in its existing form,
and that the paints subsidiary would do
better on its own. That was the rationale
for the decision by the Courtaulds board,
announced in February 1998, to break up
the group and demerge Courtaulds
Coatings as a separate company.
As it turned out, the demerger did not
go through because it was overtaken by
the bid from Akzo Nobel. But even if
Courtaulds Coatings had been listed on
the London stock market, it would
probably not have stayed independent for
long. The world paints industry was going
through a period of consolidation, and the
relatively small British company would
have been an attractive takeover target for
one of the big European
or US manufacturers. 
The takeover of
Courtaulds was
described by one
commentator as
an industrial
tragedy. But over
the preceding 30 years
Courtaulds had made mistakes and
become an unwieldy conglomerate. Under
the British financial system – widely
dispersed share ownership and an active
market for corporate control – companies
that make mistakes and lose the
confidence of their shareholders become
vulnerable to takeover.
What matters for the health of the
economy is not that any particular
company, however large and
distinguished, should be preserved intact,
but that its assets should get into the
hands of people who are likely to manage
them well. In global industries such as
man-made fibres and paints, the
appropriate owners may well be
international rather than British
companies. In such cases, there is no
reason to suppose that a foreign takeover
will put British factories and British jobs at
risk; they may well be more secure under
a foreign owner than under a British one.
This article draws on The Rise and Fall of
Great Companies: Courtaulds and the
Reshaping of the Man-made Fibres Industry
by Geoffrey Owen, published by Pasold
Research Fund/Oxford University Press in
September 2010.
Sir Geoffrey Owen is a senior fellow in LSE’s
department of management.
The assets of companies like
Cadbury and Courtaulds
should be in the hands of
people who are most likely to
manage them well
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W
hat are the
costs and
benefits of
establishing a
currency union
between
countries? In his seminal theory of
‘optimum currency areas’, Nobel laureate
Robert Mundell (1961) envisaged that the
main economic benefit would be the
increase in international trade stemming
from the elimination of currency
conversion costs and the possibly greater
predictability of prices.
The main argument against currency
unions is the loss of member countries’
independence to tailor monetary policy to
their local needs. But Mundell suggested
that three conditions reduce the cost of
relinquishing monetary independence –
similarity of the economic shocks that
members experience; wage and price
flexibility; and mobility of capital and
labour. These conditions tilt the policy
choice in favour of a currency union.
Until very recently, there has been little
progress in the empirical assessment of
the costs and benefits of joining a
currency union. Indeed, 40 years after
Mundell’s seminal paper, Andrew Rose
(2000) would present the first systematic
attempt to quantify the effect of currency
unions on trade. Rose estimated that
sharing a common currency increased
bilateral trade between countries by 
over 200%. This result was received 
with some scepticism, and a large 
number of papers, including some by 
Rose himself, investigated the robustness
of the initial finding.
Empirically assessing the effects of
currency unions on trade is a difficult task
that raises a number of methodological
issues (discussed in Baldwin, 2006), which
have not always been dealt with
satisfactorily. Despite concerns about the
reliability of the empirical results, most
work in this area found a substantial effect
on trade from pre-euro currency unions,
and a consensus grew that such unions do
indeed enhance trade, even if by less than
initially estimated. But projections for the
eurozone were hard to make because the
union involved relatively richer countries
that were already fairly well integrated.
Time was needed to gauge the trade
effect of the euro.
The creation of the euro has reinvigorated a
long-running debate about the wisdom of
currency unions. João Santos Silva and Silvana
Tenreyro investigate whether the new currency
has delivered the promised increase in trade
between member countries.
Has the euro 
increased trade? 
Short answer: no
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The first evaluation of the euro’s effect
was undertaken by Alejandro Micco and
colleagues (2003), who concluded that the
currency increased trade among eurozone
members by between 4% and 16%.
Subsequent work has addressed various
shortcomings of that study, including the
short sample period (from 1992 to 2002),
the 1993 break in the trade series
resulting from changes in the way
statistics are collected, as well as other
methodological issues discussed in
Baldwin’s 2006 paper.
These studies generally confirmed the
positive effects of the euro on trade. 
But the range of estimates for the euro’s
effect is very wide: from 2% to more 
than 70%. Unfortunately, most of these
studies are marred by methodological
weaknesses and their results should be
viewed with caution.
In an attempt to provide more reliable
evidence, our research estimates the effect
of the euro on trade using what is known
as a ‘differences-in-differences’ approach.
Loosely speaking, this technique is based
on the comparison between trade flows
for the periods before and after the euro
was introduced for two groups of
countries: those that joined the euro
during the observation period (the
‘treatment’ group) and a comparable
group of trading partners that did not join
the euro (the ‘control’ group). The effect
of the euro can then be obtained as the
difference in the changes from the pre- to
the post-euro period for the two groups. 
The use of the differences-in-
differences approach is now standard in
labour economics and health economics,
but has not been used in this context. It is
particularly appealing for this purpose
because it allows estimation of the 
euro’s effect while taking account of
systematic differences between the
countries that joined the euro and
comparable countries that did not join,
such as the UK and Denmark.
In particular, the method takes
account of the fact that the economies of
the eurozone countries were already
deeply integrated before the currency was
introduced. Micco and colleagues also
accounted for this in some of their
estimates but, as indicated, their work
suffered from other limitations.
Our study is also novel in that it
implements the differences-in-differences
estimation using methodological advances
in our earlier work on the estimation of
models for trade flows (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro, 2006).
We implement the approach using the
‘euro-12’ (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal
and Spain) as the treatment group and
analysing three control groups of different
sizes and various degrees of similarity to
the euro-12. 
Our new results confirm that long
before the euro was created, trade
between the euro-12 was already
considerably stronger than between
comparable countries, even those that
were part of the European Union. More
interestingly, the results strongly suggest
that after controlling for the fact that the
euro-12 countries already traded much
more intensively, there is little evidence
that the euro had any effect on trade
between them.
So what Mundell considered the main
benefit of a currency union does not
appear to have been realised for the euro,
at least not for the euro-12. It is, however,
possible that the euro has had and will
continue to have a significant trade effect
for newer eurozone members, the
economies of which were not so deeply
integrated before joining the euro. More
time will be needed to evaluate this
possible effect. 
This article summarises ‘Currency Unions in
Prospect and Retrospect’ by João Santos Silva
and Silvana Tenreyro, Annual Review of
Economics 2: 51-74 (September 2010).
An earlier version is available as CEP
Discussion Paper No. 986 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
pubs/download/dp0986.pdf).
João Santos Silva is a professor of economics
at the University of Essex. Silvana Tenreyro
is a reader in LSE’s economics department
and an associate in CEP’s macroeconomics
programme.
Further reading
Richard Baldwin (2006) In or Out: Does it
Make a Difference? An Evidence-based
Analysis of the Trade Effects of the Euro,
Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Alejandro Micco, Ernesto Stein and Guillermo
Ordoñez (2003) ‘The Currency Union Effect
on Trade: Early Evidence from EMU’,
Economic Policy 18: 315-56.
Robert Mundell (1961) ‘A Theory of Optimum
Currency Areas’, American Economic Review
51: 657-65.
Andrew Rose (2000) ‘One Money One Market:
Estimating the Effects of Common Currencies
on Trade’, Economic Policy 15: 9-48.
João Santos Silva and Silvana Tenreyro (2006)
‘The Log of Gravity’, Review of Economics
and Statistics 88: 641-58.
The economies of the
eurozone countries 
were already deeply
integrated before the
currency was introduced
There is little
evidence that the
creation of the
euro has had 
an effect on
trade between
the original
members
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Under what circumstances do programmes of
fiscal stimulus and fiscal austerity have a
significant impact on the level of national
economic activity? To address this question,
Ethan Ilzetzki and colleagues have 
assembled a new database on government
spending and GDP in 20 high-income countries
and 24 developing countries.
Does 
fiscal policy
work?
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O
ver the past two years,
numerous countries have
introduced packages of
‘fiscal stimulus’, increasing
government spending (or
lowering taxes) in an effort to boost
demand and bring their economies out of
recession. In such circumstances, one
might have expected a certain degree of
consensus within the economics
profession on the effectiveness of fiscal
policy. But nothing could be farther 
from the truth.
In a January 2009 piece in the Wall
Street Journal, Robert Barro argued that
the peacetime ‘fiscal multiplier’ – the
dollar increase in GDP caused by a one
dollar increase in government spending –
is essentially zero. At the other extreme,
Christina Romer, chair of President
Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers,
used multipliers as high as 1.6 in
estimating the job gains that will be
generated by the $787 billion stimulus
package approved by the US Congress in
February 2009. The difference between
the Barro and Romer views of the world
amounts to a staggering 3.7 million jobs
by the end of 2010.
There have been similar rifts in the UK.
In duelling letters to the Times and the
Financial Times, professors from the LSE
and other universities were divided on
whether immediate action was required to
reduce fiscal deficits or whether fiscal
consolidation would deepen the UK’s
recession.
The main cause of these differences is
the limited and often conflicting evidence
on the effects of fiscal policy on economic
activity. One of the biggest hurdles to
obtaining precise and consistent estimates
of fiscal multipliers has been data
availability. Most studies have relied on
evidence from a small number of
countries, typically the United States.
Existing evidence also shows very different
effects across time and countries.
For example, in a 2004 study, Roberto
Perotti estimated that the multiplier on
government expenditures might range
from as low as minus 2.3 to as high as
3.7, depending on the country and time
period studied. Even within countries he
found enormous variance. For the UK, for
example, he found that the government
expenditure multiplier declined from 0.1 in
1960-79 to minus 1.2 in 1980-2001.
To address the shortcomings of
existing evidence, we have collected 
a quarterly dataset for 44 countries (20
high-income countries and 24 developing
countries). These data have recently
become available thanks to improvements
in the data collection capacity of statistical
agencies in a number of developing
countries, and the adoption of a common
statistical standard for collecting fiscal data
in the European Union.
Using this new dataset, we are able to
estimate the effects of government
purchases on GDP with a number of
observations ten times larger than earlier
studies. And by grouping countries with
similar characteristics together, we can
derive estimates of the fiscal multiplier
that are significantly more accurate than in
studies that use data from a single
country.
Moreover, this is the first study of the
impact of fiscal policy using high-
frequency data for a broad sample of
developing countries. With data covering
countries at different stages of economic
development and differing in other
characteristics, we are able to determine
not only whether fiscal policy is likely to
be effective as a countercyclical
stabilisation tool, but also where and
when.
Given the novelty of studying the
effects of fiscal policy at business cycle
frequency in developing countries, the
natural first question is whether fiscal
policy has similar effects in developing and
high-income countries. Striking differences
emerge.
In high-income countries, an increase
in government consumption equivalent to
1% of GDP causes an immediate increase
in GDP of four tenths of 1%, implying a
fiscal multiplier of 0.4. This implies a
significant degree of ‘crowding out’ of
Expansionary government
spending has a smaller and less
persistent effect on output in
developing countries than in
high-income countries
The size of the fiscal
multiplier critically depends
on key characteristics of the
economy, including its
monetary regime and
openness to trade
private economic activity by fiscal
expansions. In other words, government
economic activity is to some extent
discouraging private sector efforts to do
the same thing.
But government purchases do not fully
crowd out the private sector. In the long
run – accounting for the cumulative
impact of government purchases on GDP
until their effects die out – our estimate of
the multiplier increases to 0.8. This still
implies some crowding out – and it
reaffirms the conjecture (often associated
with Milton Friedman) that fiscal policy is
unlikely to have a stimulative effect except
after significant delay. 
The results in developing countries are
very different. The fiscal multiplier is minus
0.2, meaning that fiscal stimulus more
than fully crowds out private activity, and
GDP will tend to decline in response to an
increase in government spending. Thus
expansions in government consumption
have a negative impact on GDP in
developing countries.
But another striking difference
between high-income countries and
developing countries is in fiscal policies
themselves. While increases in government
spending are persistent in high-income
countries, with expenditures remaining
above trend for as long as six years, these
increases are very short-lived in developing
countries, frequently followed by reversals
(with expenditures declining to below
trend) after one to two years. 
The textbook macroeconomic model
for economies open to trade in goods and
capital (the Mundell-Fleming model)
predicts that fiscal policy has very different
effects depending on a country’s monetary
arrangements. While we would expect
increases in government expenditures to
cause substantial increases in GDP where
the monetary authority pegs the value of
its currency (a fixed exchange rate regime),
their effects should be much smaller in
countries with flexible exchange
arrangements. Surprisingly, little evidence
in support of this theory has been
reported to date.
With data covering countries under
both monetary regimes, and even
countries that have changed their
monetary arrangements over time, we
provide strong evidence in favour of the
importance of the exchange rate regime
for the fiscal multiplier. As Figure 1 shows,
the long-run fiscal multiplier is large
(approximately 1.5) in countries with fixed
exchange rates; in contrast, in countries
with flexible exchange arrangements, the
long-run multiplier is essentially zero.
We find a similar result when
contrasting countries for which trade
comprises only a small part of economic
activity (where we find long-run fiscal
multipliers of 1.4) and those highly
exposed to international trade (with
multipliers of approximately zero).
This may help to explain the significant
differences in the effects of fiscal policy
across countries and time periods found in
earlier studies. For example, the significant
decline in the expansionary power of
government purchases in the UK may be
explained by the fact that the pound was
pegged to the US dollar until the early
1970s, but allowed to float freely
thereafter. Moreover, international trade
has played an increasing role in the UK’s
CentrePiece Autumn 2010
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The interaction between fiscal
and monetary policy is a crucial
determinant of the effects of
fiscal stimulus on GDP
Figure 1:
Cumulative multiplier: fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regimes
Solid lines show estimates of the cumulative fiscal multiplier at a given time horizon. 
Dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals.
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economic activity, with the ratio of trade
to GDP almost doubling since 1960. 
What explains these significant
differences across monetary
arrangements? According to the
Mundell-Fleming model, in countries with
flexible exchange rates, fiscal stimulus
causes an exchange rate appreciation,
which neutralises some of the stimulative
effect by leading to lower exports and
higher imports. But we find little
evidence for this phenomenon.
In contrast – but still consistent with
the textbook model – we find significant
differences in the responses of central
banks to fiscal stimulus, based on the
monetary regime. Central banks devoted
to maintaining a stable exchange rate
tend to lower interest rates (by an
average of 125 basis points) in response
to increases (of 1% of GDP) in
government consumption during the two
years following a fiscal stimulus. This
reinforces the fiscal stimulus and allows
for the large multipliers we estimate for
countries with this monetary regime.
Conversely, central banks with other
aims (such as an inflation target) increase
interest rates (by an average of 60 basis
points). They do so presumably to
counteract the inflationary pressures
caused by the fiscal expansion. This 
offsets the
stimulative impact of
fiscal policy and leads to the
negligible effects of fiscal stimulus for
countries with this monetary regime.
These results have important
implications for policy-makers. The
interaction between fiscal and monetary
policy is a crucial determinant of the
effects of fiscal stimulus. For example, it is
vital to consider the reaction of the Bank
of England in assessing the potential
economic fallout from the UK
government’s current austerity measures.
Should the Bank respond as inflation-
targeting central banks typically do, it will
attempt to contain the economic costs of
fiscal austerity through loose monetary
policy. On the other hand, with the
current Bank Rate at 0.5%, and the
unconventional programme of asset
purchases by the central bank already
standing at £200 billion, it is unclear
whether the Bank has the means to react
to fiscal austerity as it typically would.
Moreover, if inflation concerns force the
Bank to begin unwinding its loose
monetary policy, a coordinated fiscal-
monetary contraction could cause
significant economic pain.
The results of our study will certainly
not end the fiscal debate in the UK nor
elsewhere. Rather, they point to a broader
conclusion: that the size of the fiscal
multiplier critically depends on key
characteristics of the economy. When
considering large shifts in fiscal policy – be
it fiscal stimulus or fiscal austerity – it is
essential to look at the broader economic
environment confronting the government.
Drawing sweeping generalisations about
the impact of fiscal policy is probably an
exercise in futility.
This article summarises ‘How Big (Small?)
are Fiscal Multipliers?’ by Ethan Ilzetzki,
Enrique Mendoza and Carlos Végh, a
forthcoming CEP Discussion Paper.
Ethan Ilzetzki is a lecturer in LSE’s
economics department and a researcher in
CEP’s macroeconomics programme. Enrique
Mendoza and Carlos Végh are at the
University of Maryland.
Further reading
Robert Barro, ‘Government Spending is 
No Free Lunch,’ Wall Street Journal, 22
January 2009.
Roberto Perotti, ‘Estimating the Effects of
Fiscal Policy in OECD Countries’, mimeo,
Bocconi University, 2004.
Christina Romer and Jared Bernstein, ‘The
Job Impact of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Plan’, Council of Economic
Advisers, January 2009.
If inflation
concerns lead to
a rise in UK
interest rates, a
coordinated
fiscal-monetary
contraction could
cause significant
economic pain
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Lobbyists – professional paid advocates who aim to
influence the decisions of legislators or government
officials – play an increasingly important role in the
political system of the United States and other
democracies. In 2008, for example, $3.97 billion was
spent on lobbying US federal officials – more than twice
the amount spent ten years earlier. And recent debates on
healthcare and financial reform have been marked by
sharp criticisms of the role of staffers-turned-lobbyists in
watering down the bills. 
The movement of political staffers from roles in the
government to lucrative jobs in the lobbying industry is
often described as a ‘revolving door’. The flow of money
and staffers towards Washington’s lobbying firms has led
to concerns that corporations and other organisations are
able to buy influence and acquire privileged access to
important politicians. Furthermore, ex-staffers gain private
benefits in such transactions, and this may have a
negative impact on policy outcomes.
The most common criticism of former staffers is that they
are simply trading on their political connections. But
lobbyists who used to work in government dispute the
notion that their new roles allow them to ‘cash in’ on
their connections. They claim that their earnings reflect
expertise on policy issues and the inner workings of
government in general. In other words, they argue, it is
‘what you know’ not ‘who you know’ that matters. 
Empirically, the issue of separating the ‘what you know’
from the ‘who you know’ is a challenge for researchers. 
A plausible argument can be made that former staffers
would be high earners in many different contexts where
political connections do not matter. The specific problem
here is separating the effects of ability on earnings from
those of acquired political connections. Generally, earnings
or revenue data only allow us to observe the effects of
both factors together. 
Our research addresses this challenge by looking at the
impact of a serving politician’s exit on the lobbying
revenues of his or her former staffers. The point at 
which a politician leaves office provides a window for
examining the specific role of political connections. 
If a politician is no longer serving in Congress, then 
‘Revolving door’ lobbyists
To what extent can former government officials ‘cash in’ on the personal
connections acquired during their periods of public service? Research by
Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca and Christian Fons-Rosen provides
the first quantitative evidence of how former congressional staffers benefit
from Washington’s ‘revolving door’.
When a US senator or
representative leaves office,
the earnings of a lobbyist that
used to work for them falls on
average by one fifth
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the political connection held by their former staffers is in
effect obsolete.
This is because the politician in question no longer has
direct influence over legislative outcomes or the content
of congressional debates. In turn, this means that in cases
where gaining access is a goal of special interest groups,
lobbying spending will move away from lobbyists 
affiliated with exiting politicians and towards those with
still current connections. 
Our estimates based on this ‘identification strategy’
indicate that the value of political connections to lobbyists
is high. Lobbyists suffer a revenue loss of over 20% when
their former political employer leaves Congress. In dollar
terms, this translates into $177,000 per year for the
typical lobbyist’s practice. Furthermore, this effect is
persistent for at least three years – it seems that it is
difficult for lobbyists to offset the impact of a lost political
connection.
The size of the revenue effects also increases with the
strategic importance of a politician. Senators are more
valuable than representatives and, even within the two
chambers of Congress, more senior politicians – defined in
terms of either tenure or committee status – are more
valuable than their junior counterparts.
Our study points the way to a potential new wave of
research using data released under public disclosure laws.
The basic data we use were made available as part of the
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. Since then, non-partisan
organisations like the Center for Responsive Politics and
LegiStorm have done important work improving access
and promoting usage of the data.
Researchers now have the possibility of combining
datasets across a number of sources to search for
statistical patterns such as those we find for politically
connected lobbyists. As a result, this takes public scrutiny
to a new level. We can try to find important information
and behaviours ‘hidden’ in the data. Hence, one major
consequence of laws such as the 1995 Act is that they
make independent research and evaluation of political
questions possible.
Though our focus is on Washington, this study is relevant
for policy-makers and regulators in Britain. In particular it
must be noted that our research would not be possible
here. The government simply does not demand the
registration and reporting of lobbying activity in the same
way as in the United States. 
This has allowed lobbying in Britain to take place in the
form of a shadow economy, as demonstrated by the case
of former Labour cabinet minister Stephen Byers, who was
secretly recorded offering himself to potential employers
outside government as ‘a sort of cab for hire’ for up to
£5,000 a day.
Recently, there have been signs of change in Britain. The
coalition government has pledged to reform current
practices. But this ambition should be treated with some
scepticism. There are a lot of vested interests intent on
keeping lobbying activity unreported, and so the ‘new
politics’ could well end up being a lot like the old politics.
The standard claim 
of lobbyists – that it is ‘what
you know’ not ‘who you know’
that matters – does not stand
up to formal scrutiny
This article summarises ‘Revolving Door
Lobbyists’ by Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca
and Christian Fons-Rosen, CEP Discussion Paper
No. 993 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/dp0993.pdf). A video interview
discussing the study is available here:
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAnd
Audio/research/washingtonsRevolvingDoor.aspx
Jordi Blanes i Vidal is a lecturer in LSE’s
management department and a CEP research
associate. Mirko Draca is a CEP research
economist. Christian Fons-Rosen is an assistant
professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra. All are
part of CEP’s research programme on
productivity and innovation.
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F
or those who favour
introducing more
competition into
healthcare, there is quite
a bit to like in the NHS
White Paper published in
July 2010. Health secretary Andrew
Lansley’s first major policy statement
encourages public and private healthcare
providers to compete for care; expands
patient choice; and places a tremendous
premium on publishing transparent
information on a number of dimensions of
clinical performance (DH, 2010). 
These elements of the reforms are
crucial for the health service. Ultimately,
increasing competition in the NHS is vital
to improving quality and efficiency – just
as it is in other sectors of the economy.
Recent CEP research illustrates that
market-based reforms to the NHS in the
mid-2000s, which focused on promoting
patient choice and hospital competition,
saved lives (Cooper et al, 2010a),
improved efficiency (Cooper et al, 2010b)
and boosted management quality (Bloom
et al, 2010).
It is also encouraging that the White
Paper calls for allowing flexible pay across
the country. Giving hospitals the ability to
set wages will allow them to hire the kind
of staff they want and need to run their
organisations efficiently. Adding pay
flexibility should also go a long way
towards reducing the staggering variation
in mortality across the country. Indeed,
widely reported CEP work shows that
current pay regulation, which keeps the
earnings of medical professionals largely
the same wherever they work, has
contributed to higher death rates by
depressing real wage rates in high cost
In the first of a new series of CentrePiece
articles analysing policy innovations by the
coalition government, Zack Cooper assesses the
plans for healthcare reform in the light of
recent CEP research.
The NHS White Paper:
evolution or revolution? 
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areas (Propper and Van Reenen, 2010).
These aspects of the reforms
constitute a sensible extension of the
successful market-based reforms instituted
by the previous Labour government. But
the problem is that there are other
elements in the reforms that are in tension
with this evolution and which break
Andrew Lansley’s election campaign
pledge to avoid sweeping top-down
shake-ups of the health service. 
In the White Paper, the health
secretary proposes a radical shake-up of
how care gets commissioned in England.
Broadly, he is proposing to shift the
commissioning process from primary care
trusts (PCTs) to general practitioners (GPs)
and in doing so, he is placing an
extraordinary amount of power in the
hands of clinicians. GPs in England are
clearly very capable, but it is not clear that
they want to be the principal
commissioners of care, that they
necessarily have the specific skills to
commission services effectively and,
perhaps most importantly, that they
support the government’s broader
healthcare reform agenda.
Commissioning care has been a
perennial bedbug for the NHS for the last
20 years. Since the purchaser/provider split
was introduced in the 1990s, a range of
organisations have been tasked with
purchasing care on patients’ behalf and
organising care locally for patients. To date,
none of the commissioning bodies have
thrived. A damning recent report from the
House of Commons highlights concerns
that PCTs have been far too passive, have
failed to prompt hospitals to improve the
quality and efficiency and have not been
active enough coordinating highly
specialised services for organ
transplantation and cancer care (Health
Select Committee, 2010). These failures
have raised transaction costs in the NHS,
allowed hospitals to operate virtually
unchecked and hindered efforts to improve
care for complex conditions.
There are a number of root causes of
these failures. Generally, according to the
Health Select Committee, the staff at PCTs
are often under-skilled, lack clinical
knowledge and have not used data
adequately to improve the commissioning
process. In part, this is because PCTs have
had almost no monetary incentives to
improve. Over the last decade, PCTs have
seen their budgets grow annually,
regardless of their performance. 
Under the White Paper proposals, GPs
are to be given the ability to commission
nearly every aspect of care for NHS
patients and they will be collectively
responsible for almost the whole of the
NHS budget. While there is some reason to
believe that this sort of power will increase
care in the community (which is vital to
reining in NHS spending), the proposals are
worrying because having good clinical skills
does not necessarily guarantee that GPs
will be effective commissioners. 
There is some precedent for giving GPs
more purchasing power. The previous
Conservative government did just that in
the 1990s with some positive results.
Published evidence examining the GP
fundholding policy suggests that it reduced
pharmaceutical use, lowered elective
referral rates and allowed GPs to make
some savings by lowering the demand for
clinical services. This kind of check on
demand and built-in incentive to provide
care locally is badly needed in the NHS
right now. 
But the GP fundholding programme
from the 1990s also had very tangible
downsides. In the long term, GP
fundholding led to higher managerial and
transaction costs because GPs had to
spend much more time negotiating with
hospitals, and hospitals had to spend more
time and money negotiating with them.
In addition, what should also worry
David Cameron is that GP fundholding led
to a substantial drop in measured patient
satisfaction during the 1990s. One
explanation for this unhappiness is 
that GPs were spending more time
working as managers and less time 
dealing with patients.
So what are the
implications of giving GPs
expansive commissioning
power more than a 
decade after GP
fundholding was abolished?
NHS reforms 
in the mid-2000s
helped to
increase
competition,
which saved
lives, improved
efficiency and
boosted
management
quality
For those who favour introducing
more competition into healthcare,
there are things to like in 
the NHS White Paper
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Zack Cooper is a health economist at 
LSE Health and CEP.
Further reading
Nick Bloom, Carol Propper, Stephan 
Seiler and John Van Reenen (2010) ‘The
Impact of Competition on Management
Quality: Evidence from Public Hospitals’,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 983
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0983.pdf).
Zack Cooper, Stephen Gibbons, Simon 
Jones and Alistair McGuire (2010a) ‘Does
Hospital Competition Save Lives? Evidence
from the English NHS Patient Choice
Reforms’, LSE Health Working Paper 
No. 16/2020 (http://www2.lse.ac.uk/
LSEHealthAndSocialCare/LSEHealth/
pdf/Workingpapers/WP16.pdf).
Zack Cooper, Stephen Gibbons, Simon Jones
and Alistair McGuire (2010b) ‘Does Hospital
Competition Improve Efficiency? An Analysis
of the Recent Market-Based Reforms to the
English NHS’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 988
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0988.pdf).
Department of Health, DH (2010) Equity and
Excellence: Liberating the NHS, NHS White
Paper (http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/
Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/
PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_117353).
Anna Dixon, Ruth Robertson, John Appleby,
Peter Burge, Nancy Devlin and Helen Magee
(2010) Patient Choice: How Patients Choose
and How Providers Respond, King’s Fund
(http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/
patient_choice.html).
Health Select Committee (March 2010) Health
Committee Fourth Report – Commissioning,
House of Commons.
Carol Propper and John Van Reenen (2010)
‘Can Pay Regulation Kill? Panel Data
Evidence on the Effect of Labour Markets 
on Hospital Performance’, Journal of 
Political Economy (earlier version 
available as CEP Discussion Paper No. 843
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0843.pdf).
On the positive side, there is some
reason to believe that the transaction costs
will be less dramatic than they were 
15 years ago. Right now, hospitals cannot
alter their reimbursement rates, so the
negotiations between GPs and hospitals
will be vastly simpler than they were in the
1990s. This time around, in addition to
their clinical responsibilities, GPs will spend
the bulk of their time purchasing care and
planning care pathways, rather than
negotiating rates with hospitals. 
In addition, the White Paper allows
patients to choose who will commission
their care. This will create incentives 
for the GP consortiums to become 
more efficient if they face a real risk 
that poor performance will reduce their
market share. 
Unfortunately, on balance, these
reforms seem to be a knee-jerk response
to the very real shortcomings of PCTs. The
White Paper places unprecedented power
in the hands of GPs, with little evidence
about whether they are interested in
taking on this new role or if they are
going to be better equipped to
commission than PCTs. To be sure,
involving clinicians in the management of
the health service is important, but
medical knowledge is not wholly akin to
the managerial skills that are vital to
effective commissioning. We just do not
know whether or not GPs will be more or
less capable commissioners than PCTs. 
There is plenty of evidence that 
there are some very entrepreneurial GPs
who will thrive at commissioning. But
what will happen to the commissioning
process for patients registered with GPs
who either have no inclination or capacity
to purchase services? That problem could
prove calamitous. 
Another significant problem with
giving GPs fundholding power is that it is
not clear that they support the
government’s ambition to increase choice
and competition in the NHS. For example,
recent work by the King’s Fund finds that
while over three quarters of patients were
extremely keen to have choice, GPs do not
regard choice as imperative for patients
(Dixon et al, 2010). What is more, GPs are
reluctant to offer patients their private
sector options for care and, in some cases,
they are reluctant to offer patients any
choice whatsoever when specialist
treatment is required.
It is possible therefore that these
reforms will put GPs in a position to throw
the government’s overall policy agenda off
course. In fact, Hamish Meldrum, chairman
of the Council of the British Medical
Association, has explicitly said that GPs
should take over commissioning not to
increase competition but so that their
monopoly power over the process can
blunt the government’s push for it. 
In sum, there are things to like in the
White Paper and it is encouraging that the
coalition government is actively promoting
choice and competition in the NHS. But
with so many unknowns, the wholesale
transfer of purchasing power to GPs is too
much, too fast.
In the long term, giving GPs purchasing
power might very well work, but it needs
to be trialled, tested and piloted. This is a
general rule for policies across all areas of
government. At the moment, when funds
are tight, this big a shift of purchasing
power to an untested system is an
extraordinary gamble given that we know
that large-scale shake-ups typically cost
substantial amounts of money – something
that will be in short supply over the next
few years.
The wholesale
transfer of
purchasing
power to GPs is
too much, too
fast – it
threatens to
increase
spending
dramatically, not
reduce it
CentrePiece Autumn 2010
18
The state of apprenticeships
Numbers and completion rates of apprenticeships in 
England are at an all-time high. Yet according to a report by
Hilary Steedman, the country’s apprenticeship provision still
lags behind those elsewhere in the world.
There are no headlines in the quality press. But this year, as
every year, thousands of young people will not get the
apprenticeship place they desperately seek. The demand for
apprenticeship is outstripping places everywhere in the
world. But in England, the situation is worse than in many
other countries with a significantly lower proportion of
apprentices in the labour force: just 11 for every 1,000
employees compared with 39 in Australia, 40 in Germany
and 43 in Switzerland. 
Young people know that, like a degree, apprenticeship pays
in better employment prospects and higher lifetime
earnings. Why then do at least a quarter of all businesses
abroad offer apprenticeships but fewer than one in ten in
England? And why in Germany do almost all very large
firms (those with over 500 employees) take on apprentices
but under a third in England?
Some of the answers can be found in our report comparing
apprenticeship in eight countries – Australia, Austria,
England, France, Germany, Ireland, Sweden and
Switzerland. One reason for more apprenticeships abroad is
that generous subsidies are available to employers who
expand the number of places available. Employers in
England receive no subsidies and pay higher wages to their
apprentices than their counterparts abroad.
Training is also shorter in England and with less time 
off-the-job. Lower wages and longer apprenticeships allow
employers abroad to provide more training and cover more
of their training costs. In addition, employers in England
face greater handicaps than their counterparts abroad:
■ England still comes out badly in international
comparisons of basic skills (mathematics), far
outstripped by Australia and Switzerland.
■ Unlike in other countries, there is no route through
apprenticeship to higher education.
■ Careers education in schools is woefully
inadequate despite excellent models available
elsewhere. Schools are often hostile to work-
based learning and provide little or no
assistance.
■ Occupational standards are too inflexible
and standard setting is too remote from
employers’ needs.
These problems and the shortfall in places persist in part
because of differences in the management of
apprenticeships in England. In Austria, France, Germany
and Switzerland, employers are in charge of standards
and, unlike most English employers, recruit and train their
own apprentices. Employer organisations also take
responsibility for much of the necessary infrastructure 
of support. 
In England, the Apprenticeship Ambassadors Network has
worked hard to make the business case for
apprenticeship, but ‘ownership’ by employers remains
elusive. Employers here need to claim back from
government the responsibilities and trust that would
enable them to provide the apprenticeships that we need. 
This article summarises The State of Apprenticeship in 2010
– International Comparisons: Australia, Austria, England,
France, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland by Hilary
Steedman, jointly published by CEP and the Apprenticeship
Ambassadors Network. The report is available for download
here: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/special/cepsp22.pdf
Hilary Steedman is a Senior Research Fellow at CEP.
The Apprenticeship Ambassadors Network is a group 
of senior business leaders committed to the 
expansion and development of apprenticeships
(http://www.employersforapprentices.gov.uk/).
in brief...
Employers need to
claim back from
government the
responsibilities and
trust that would enable
them to provide more
apprenticeships
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T
he gradual introduction of
academy schools into
England’s educational
system has been a
controversial policy
innovation. Supporters passionately believe
that academies can make a real difference
to pupils’ educational outcomes, while
critics claim that they are just a way of
privatising the state education system by
stealth. But who is right – and what impact
will the coalition government have on
academy school policy?
Academies are independent, non-
selective, state-funded schools that fall
outside the control of local authorities, and
are managed by a private team of
independent co-sponsors. The sponsors
then delegate the management of the
school to a largely self-appointed board of
governors.
An academy usually has around 13
governors, with seven typically appointed
by the sponsor. Each governing body is
responsible for employing staff, agreeing
pay and conditions of service with its
employees and deciding on the school’s
policies on staffing structure, career
development, discipline and performance
management.
The first clutch of academies was
opened in September 2002 by the Labour
government with the clear policy aim of
improving educational outcomes in
deprived areas. Poorly performing schools
were awarded academy status by taking
over or replacing schools that were either
in special measures or seen as under-
achieving. The hope was that the
combination of independence to pursue
innovative school policies and curricula,
with the experience of the sponsor, would
enable academies to drive up the
educational attainment of their pupils. 
The performance of 
academy schools
Our research seeks to evaluate the
performance of academy schools by
comparing them with a selected group of
schools that are due to become academies
in the future but have yet to make the
transition to academy status. The latter
group consists of schools that are very
similar in their pre-academy characteristics
to the pre-academy characteristics of the
schools that have already become
academies.
We believe that, with careful statistical
analysis, these ‘future academies’ can
provide a counterfactual, allowing us to
see what would have happened to the
current academies had they not become
In the second of our series on policies of the coalition
government, Stephen Machin and James Vernoit
compare academy schools created by Labour with the new
‘coalition academies’, those that have either opened this
autumn or applied for academy status since the election.
Academy schools:
who benefits?
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Figures 1 and 2 compare the
characteristics of secondary schools that
were approved to open as academies
under the Labour government with those
that have been approved by the new
government. Also shown are the
characteristics of schools that have applied
to the new government for academy
status and all state secondary schools.
academies. A comparison of the
performance of the current academy
schools, both before and after they
became academies, with the future
academies over the same time period,
enables us to identify the impact of
academy status on the performance of 
the school. 
Our preliminary results show that
academies that have been open for at
least two years have been able to
generate a significant improvement in
their GCSE performance compared with
the future academies. We find that an
extra 3% of pupils in the academies are
achieving at least five or more grades A*-
C at GCSE/GNVQ compared with the
schools that have not yet become
academies.
For the academy schools that have
been open for a shorter time than two
years, we do not find any significant
improvement in GCSE performance. This
may explain why an earlier study (Machin
and Wilson, 2009) was unable to find any
positive effects of academy status on pupil
achievement.
Overall, these results suggest that
academy schools can deliver faster gains in
GCSE performance than comparable
schools. Given the preliminary nature of
these findings, we are reluctant to draw
too strong a conclusion. But it does seem
that converting to academy status – at
least under the Labour government’s
model of converting disadvantaged
schools to academies – may actually
deliver significant improvements in GSCE
performance. At the same time, we need
to be patient for any performance
enhancing ‘academy effect’ to emerge. 
The impact of the coalition
government on academy
school policy 
The education policies of the coalition
government have reawakened controversy
about academies. This seems to stem
largely from the changing aim of the
academies programme under the new
government (Machin and Vernoit, 2010).
The government has made clear its
intention to expand the academies
programme significantly. To do so, it
initially asked every headteacher in
England if they would be interested in
academy status. By 31 August 2010,
170 mainstream schools had made
an application to convert to
academy status. Progress has
been rapid, and 31 of these
schools have had their
application accepted
and started operating
as academy schools in
September 2010.
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■ Coalition – 2010/2011 open academies (25)
■ Coalition – academy status applicants (99)
■ All other maintained secondary
■ Labour academies (267)
Notes: Number of academies in September 2010. The Labour academies 
opened in the following academic years: 02/03 – 3 opened, 03/04 – 9 opened,
04/05 – 5 opened, 05/06 – 10 opened, 06/07 – 19 opened, 07/08 – 37 opened,
08/09 – 47 opened, 09/10 – 73 opened, 10/11 – 64 opened.
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‘Coalition
academies’ are
significantly
more advantaged
than the average
secondary school
– and even more
so compared
with Labour
academies 
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Summary
Following the change of government,
there has been a U-turn in academy
schools policy. Under the Labour
government, the programme was aimed
at combating disadvantage, and we find
evidence that it may actually have
achieved this objective in schools that
have had academy status for a long
enough period.
Under the coalition government, the
academies programme is now likely to
reinforce advantage and exacerbate
existing inequalities in schooling. At a
time of budget restraint, it seems
natural to question whether the
large expenditure involved in
converting these
advantaged schools to
academies is justified.
Figure 1 shows the academic
performance of the different groups of
schools, as measured by the proportion of
children achieving five or more A*-C
GCSE passes. Figure 2 shows an indicator
of deprivation in the different groups of
schools, the proportion of pupils who are
eligible for free school meals.
It is clear from this evidence that the
academies that opened in September
2010 – and the schools that have applied
to the coalition government to become
academies in due course – are
significantly more advantaged than the
average secondary school. They are even
more advantaged compared with those
schools that were approved to open as
academies under Labour.
The ‘coalition academies’ contain far
lower proportions of pupils who are
eligible for free school meals, and they
are considerably better performing
schools in terms of GCSE results. 
Stephen Machin is a professor of economics
at University College London and CEP’s
research director. James Vernoit is 
a researcher in CEP’s education and 
skills programme.
Under Labour,
academy school
policy was aimed 
at combating
disadvantage;
under the
coalition, it is
likely to reinforce
advantage
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■ Coalition – academy status applicants (99)
■ All other maintained secondary
■ Labour academies (267)
Figure 2:
Percentage of secondary school pupils who 
are eligible for free school meals
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Further reading
Stephen Machin and James Vernoit (2010) 
‘A Note on Academy School Policy’, CEP Policy
Analysis (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
pa011.pdf).
Stephen Machin and Joan Wilson (2009)
‘Public and Private Schooling Initiatives in
England’, in Rajashri Chakrabarti and 
Paul Peterson (eds) School Choice
International: Exploring Public-Private
Partnerships, MIT Press.
CentrePiece Autumn 2010
22
I
n the UK today, the richest tenth
of male earners receive almost
four times as much as the poorest
tenth; 30 years ago they only
earned twice as much. A good
chunk of this increase in wage inequality is
due to higher returns to education (see
Figure 1). Because this has been
accompanied by a massive increase in the
proportion of the university educated, the
inescapable conclusion is that the demand
for more highly skilled workers has risen.
This holds true across the developed
world. The academic consensus is that this
increase in skill demand is linked to
technological progress, driving up the
demand for workers who are able to deal
with a more complex and challenging
workplace.
New facts on inequality have recently
emerged. In the United States, ‘upper half’
inequality – the difference between the
richest tenth of the population and the
middle – has risen continuously over the
last three decades. But after increasing
during the 1980s, ‘lower half’ inequality –
the difference between the middle and
the poorest tenth – has actually fallen
since then (see Figure 2).
And while college graduates’ wages
have continued to increase relative to
those of non-graduates, high school
graduates’ wages (the wages of those
who leave school at age 18) have ceased
to increase relative to those of high-school
dropouts (those who leave at age 16)
since the 1990s. It also seems that jobs in
middle-skilled occupations have decreased
relative to both high-skilled and low-skilled
occupations across Europe and North
America (see Figure 3).
Information technologies
replace mid-level jobs: look
at the cleaning robots
What could account for this ‘polarisation’,
in which the prospects of the middle-
skilled have been declining? One clue is to
be found by looking at robot competitions
in Japan. Every year in Tokyo, the ‘Robo-
One’ competition rewards the robot that is
best at doing tasks such as cleaning,
playing football, dancing and punching
other robots (really hard). What is
Over the last 30 years, inequality has risen as
new technologies have massively increased the
demand for highly skilled workers. But as
research by Guy Michaels and colleagues
shows, it is not simply a case of the more
educated benefiting at the expense of the less
educated; rather, it is the middle-skilled who are
losing out most.
The shrinking middle:
how new technologies are
polarising the labour market 
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remarkable about this competition is 
not so much the sophistication of
Japanese technology, but how bad these
robots are at doing things that humans
find very easy. 
This suggests that what new
technologies – such as information and
communication technologies (ICT) – are
very good at doing is replacing repetitive,
boring, ‘routine’ tasks (Autor et al, 
2003; Goos and Manning, 2007). Tasks
that require responding rapidly to
unfamiliar situations (such as driving or
cleaning) are not easy for robots to
reproduce. Repetitive activities that were
traditionally performed by less educated
workers, such as assembly workers in a car
factory, have been good candidates for job
destruction by new technology. 
But it isn’t only this group that has
been affected. ICT has also reduced the
need for middle-educated workers
carrying out routine tasks. Bank clerks, for
example, have found demand for their
services plummeting as a result of
computerisation – ATMs, online banking
and the like.
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Source: Machin and Van Reenen (2010), General Household Survey and
Labour Force Survey.
Figure 1:
Increasing returns to higher education: the wage ratio
between all UK workers with a college degree and all UK
workers without a college degree, 1980-2004
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Figure 2:
The divergence of upper half and lower half inequality in
the United States, 1975-2005
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Technology has raised the
demand for college-educated
workers and reduced 
the relative demand for
middle-skilled workers
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Growth in ICT intensity
Note: The figure plots the growth of ICT/VA
(the ratio of information and communication
technology to value added) against the
growth of the highest skill group (the share
of the wage bill going to those with college
education). This is done across the entire
economy of 11 OECD countries between
1980-2004.
More educated workers making
analytical, non-routine use of ICT – such
as management consultants, advertising
executives and physicians – have found
their jobs made easier by ICT rather than
threatened by it. Nor has ICT reduced the
demand for less educated workers
carrying out non-routine manual tasks –
such as janitors and cab drivers – contrary
to claims that low-skilled jobs are
disappearing (see Figure 4). 
Since the number of routine jobs in
the traditional manufacturing sectors (such
as car assembly) declined substantially in
the 1970s, the subsequent growth of
computerisation may have primarily
increased demand for highly educated
workers at the expense of those in the
middle of the educational distribution,
leaving the least educated (mainly working
in non-routine manual jobs) largely
unaffected.
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Source: Mieske (2009), updates Goos and Manning (2007), percentage changes for entire period.
Figure 3:
Lovely and lousy jobs: employment share growth 
1979-2008 by job quality (occupational wage), UK
Figure 4:
A taxonomy of tasks
Job quality decile (1979 median wage)
Task type Task 
description
Example of 
occupations
Education 
levels
Effect 
of ICT
Change in
demand
Non-manual Clerical,
Book-keepers
Middle Direct 
substitution
Down 5
Non-routine Non-manual Abstract problem
solving (analytic)
mental flexibility
Managers, doctors
lawyers, scientists
High Strongly 
complementary
Up 1
Manual Environmental 
adaptability
Interpersonal
adaptability
Maids, janitors 
security guards
waiters, drivers
Low Broadly 
neutral
Zero
Routine Manual Rules based 
repetitive 
procedural
Assembly line 
workers
Low Direct 
substitution
Down 5
Figure 5:
In countries where technology grew fastest, so did the share of the most highly skilled
CentrePiece Autumn 2010
25
-0
5
10
15
20
4%3%2%1%0
Wood
Machinery
Rubber
Textiles
Manufacturing
Agriculture
MineralsMetals
Transport Chemicals
Paper
Electrical
5
10
15
20
25
4%3%2%1%0
Wood
Machinery
Rubber
Textiles
Manufacturing
Food
Agriculture
Minerals
Metals
Transport
Chemicals
Paper
Electrical
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
4%3%2%1%0
Wood
Machinery
Rubber
Textiles
Manufacturing
Agriculture
Minerals
Metals
Food
Transport
ChemicalsPaper
Electrical
Figure 7:
ICT growth causes big decrease in middle skill share
Figure 6:
ICT growth causes big increase in highest skill share
Figure 8:
ICT growth causes small increase/no change in least skill share
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Growth in ICT intensity
Growth in ICT intensity
In industries where technical change was fastest, the 
middle-skilled lost out to the most skilled and the least
skilled: growth of skills shares and ICT, 1980-2004
Note: All three figures plot the growth of ICT/VA (ratio of the information and communication
technology to value added) against the growth of a skill group (the share of the wage bill going to
the education group). This is done across all the traded sectors of 11 OECD countries between
1980-2004. Michaels et al (2010) show this pattern also holds for non-traded sectors.
Substitution of
middle-skilled
workers by high-
skilled workers
is most prevalent
in industries 
with higher R&D
and higher 
use of ICT
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Technology is replacing the
middle-skilled
To look at whether technology is reducing
demand for those in the middle, we have
conducted a simple test using 25 years of
data across 11 countries and all sectors of
the economy. If our story is right, we
would expect industries that had a faster
growth of computerisation to have also
had an increase in demand for college-
educated workers relative to workers with
middle levels of education, leaving the
least skilled unaffected. Our analysis of the
data reveals that this is basically what has
been going on.
After 1980, countries with faster
upgrading of ICT (Finland, the Netherlands,
the UK and the United States) also saw the
most rapid increase in high-skilled workers
(see Figure 5). Across different countries,
similar industries – for example, financial
services, telecommunications and electrical
equipment manufacturers – replaced
middle-skilled workers with high-skilled
workers at the fastest rate.
This finding is consistent with a
technology-based explanation for
polarisation, but not with alternative
explanations that emphasise institutional
changes, such as the decline of 
trade unions or the introduction of
minimum wages.
Changes in skill demand across
industries are strongly correlated with ICT
upgrading. Industries that experienced
more rapid ICT upgrading also increased
the relative demand for high-skilled
workers (see Figure 6) at the expense of
middle-skilled workers (see Figure 7), with
little impact on low-skilled workers (see
Figure 8).
The change in demand reflected an
increase in both the wages and the hours
worked by high-skilled workers relative to
middle-skilled workers. We document this
finding not only for the full sample of
countries together, but also separately for
the United States and for continental
Europe. 
There is also evidence of technology
polarising the demand for skills not only
through increased intensity of ICT.
Industries that engage in more research
and development (R&D) also show the
same pattern of substitution of middle-
skilled workers by high-skilled workers.
Taken together, ICT upgrading and R&D
account for about a quarter of skill
upgrading since 1980. 
What about trade?
An alternative explanation for the falling
demand for non-college workers is
globalisation. The idea is that increased
trade with low-wage countries like China
has depressed the wages and taken the
jobs of the less skilled.
We find that the positive correlation
between trade openness and the increased
demand for high-skilled relative to middle-
skilled disappears once we control for
technological change. This could either
mean no role for trade or a more subtle
effect whereby trade has an indirect effect
by inducing faster technical change (an
effect discussed elsewhere in this
CentrePiece – see page 2).
In either case, unless one believes in a
Luddite view of smashing machines, there
is no reason to erect trade barriers to
protect less skilled workers from the effects
of China, India or other emerging
economies.
Conclusions
Polarisation is not bad news for the least
skilled – there will be jobs for them even in
a high-tech world. But for the middle
classes, technology may be endangering
their future labour market prospects.
This article summarises ‘Has ICT Polarized
Skill Demand? Evidence from Eleven
Countries over 25 Years’ by Guy Michaels,
Ashwini Natraj and John Van Reenen, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 987
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0987.pdf).
Guy Michaels is a lecturer in LSE’s
economics department and a research
associate in CEP’s labour markets
programme. Ashwini Natraj is a research
assistant in CEP’s productivity and 
innovation programme. John Van Reenen is
director of CEP.
Further reading 
David Autor, Frank Levy and Richard
Murnane (2003) ‘The Skill Content of Recent
Technological Change: An Empirical
Exploration’, Quarterly Journal of Economics
118(4): 1279-333.
Claudia Goldin and Larry Katz (2008) The
Race Between Education and Technology,
Belknap Harvard – reviewed by John Van
Reenen in the November 2010 issue of the
Economic Journal.
Maarten Goos and Alan Manning (2007)
‘Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The Rising
Polarization of Work in Britain’, Review of
Economics and Statistics 89(1): 118-33.
Stephen Machin and John Van Reenen (2010)
‘Inequality’, CEP Election Analysis
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
ea015.pdf).
Karl Mieske (2009) ‘Low-skill Service Jobs
and Technical Change’, unpublished MSc
dissertation, University College London.
The middle
classes should
beware – the
robots are
coming for 
you next
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The future of finance
The financial crash of 2008-9 has been the most
damaging economic event since the Great Depression,
affecting the lives of hundreds of millions of people. The
most immediate problem now is to prevent a repeat
performance. 
The central question is what the financial system is for?
Standard texts list five main functions: channelling savings
into real investment; transferring risk; maturity
transformation (including smoothing of lifecycle
consumption); effecting payments; and making markets.
But looking at how financial companies make their
money, it is extraordinarily difficult to see how closely this
corresponds to the stated functions, and it is often
difficult to explain why the rewards can be so high. Any
explanation must also explain why the system is so prone
to boom and bust.
The opening chapters of the LSE
report (by Adair Turner, Andrew
Haldane and Paul Woolley) deal with
these fundamental issues: the ideal
functions of the system; the way the
system has actually operated; and
the sources of boom and bust. To
answer these questions, much of the
abstract theory of finance has to be
abandoned in favour of a more
realistic model of how the different
agents actually behave.
Central to this is opacity and
asymmetric information, combined
with short-term performance-related
pay. For example, the asset price
momentum that accompanies
booms occurs because the owners of giant funds expect
fund managers to shift into the fastest rising stocks. (They
would do better to invest on a longer-term basis.)
The opacity of the system has increased enormously with
the growth of derivatives. Did this contribute to high long-
term growth? The issue remains open. On one side,
people point to the high real growth during the period
1950-73 (an era of financial repression) and the real cost
of the present downturn. On the other side, many studies,
discussed in the report by Sushil Wadhwani, point to real
benefits from financial deepening. But apart from his
chapter, all other contributors invoke the need for a
radically simplified and slimmer financial system.
There are four aims of such a reform. The first is to
prevent the financial system destabilising the real
economy, as it has in the recent
past. The second (closely related) is
to protect taxpayers against the
possible cost of bailouts. The third is
to reduce the share of real national
income that accrues as income to
the financial sector and its
employees for reasons not related to
the benefits it confers – thus
absorbing into the sector talent that
could be more usefully used
elsewhere. And all of this has to be
done in a way that works.
There are two main lines of
approach. The first is regulation –
higher capitalisation of all financial
institutions, and levels of required
capital that rise in a boom and fall
What is a financial system for? That is the starting point for the LSE’s
recent report on reform of the world’s financial system, which brings
together the work of leading academics, financiers, journalists and
officials from the UK’s Financial Services Authority, the Bank of
England and the Treasury.
The financial system has become far
more complicated than it needs to be 
to discharge its functions – and
dangerously unstable into the bargain
in brief...
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in a slump. In the report, Charles Goodhart points to
some of the difficulties involved in any such regulation;
Andrew Smithers shows that asset price booms can be
identified, at least sometimes; and Andrew Large discusses
how such information could be used, if there were an
independent committee specifically charged with
‘macroprudential regulation’. (Sushil Wadhwani argues by
contrast that financial booms should be mainly controlled
via interest rates.)
The second main approach to a more stable system is
institutional reform. John Kay argues strongly for the
introduction of narrow banking. In such a system, only
deposit-taking institutions could expect to be insured
through the state, and they would not be allowed to build 
up a balance sheet of risky assets. This is a version of the
so-called Volcker Rule.
Faced with these two possible lines of approach, Martin
Wolf comes down in favour of strong regulation, linked
perhaps to some institutional reform, aimed especially at
greater competition. He argues that the state would in
fact bail out any major financial institution threatened
with bankruptcy, whether deposit-taking or not; it must
therefore regulate all institutions. 
Moreover managers must face totally different incentives
and pay. In particular, Wolf suggests the managers should
be liable to repay a substantial proportion of their pay if
their institution requires state assistance or goes bankrupt
within ten years of their getting that pay.
All these proposals would directly reduce the profitability
of banks and the pay of bankers. Do they have a chance?
In the final chapter of the report, Peter Boone and Simon
Johnson document the huge influence that banks exert in
the political sphere worldwide. They argue that only a
worldwide system of regulation embodied in a global
body, comparable to the World Trade Organization, could
have a chance.
In this context, it is encouraging that the Working Party of
the G20 Financial Stability Board, which will deliver
proposals to the G20 Summit this November, is chaired by
the author of the report’s opening chapter, Adair Turner.
What’s needed is a
radically simplified
and slimmer
financial system
The Future of Finance: The LSE Report was published in
September 2010 (ISBN: 978 0 85328 458 1, £14.99). To order a
copy: call 0845 458 9910; email: mo@centralbooks.com;
or visit http://www.futureoffinance.org.uk
The book was discussed at a major conference at Savoy Place, London, in July
2010. Both the conference and the work of the group were funded by the Paul
Woolley Centre for Capital Market Dysfunctionality at LSE, and jointly
planned by Paul Woolley and Richard Layard, founder-director of CEP.
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CEP is pleased to announce
the latest volume in 
‘The State of Working
Britain’ series.
The third volume of the series – The
Labour Market in Winter: The State of
Working Britain 2010 edited by Paul
Gregg and Jonathan Wadsworth – will
be published in November 2010 by
Oxford University Press.
The latest volume provides an overview
of key issues concerning the
performance of the labour market and
policy, with the focus this time around
on the latest recession and its aftermath.
The intention is to be an indispensable
reference source on contemporary labour
market developments in the UK, which
will be of lasting use to academics,
students, practitioners and policy-
makers. 
Topics covered include:
■ Employment and unemployment
trends in the downturn
■ Immigration
■ An assessment of the efficacy of
family-friendly work schemes
■ An evaluation of education reforms
■ Wage inequality and intergenerational
income mobility
■ Happiness, wellbeing and job security
over the economic cycle
Details of the previous volumes – 
The State of Working Britain edited by
Paul Gregg and Jonathan Wadsworth
and The Labour Market Under New
Labour: The State of Working Britain
edited by Richard Dickens, Paul Gregg
and Jonathan Wadsworth can be found
at:
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/state2/default.asp
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THE STATE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY
A strong and sustained world recovery requires two rebalancing acts. Internal, with a shift in
advanced countries from fiscal support to private demand. External, with an increase in net
exports in deficit countries, notably the United States, and a decrease in net exports in
surplus countries, notably China. Policy should be aimed at increasing the pace of
rebalancing. 
Speaker: Olivier Blanchard, Chief Economist and Director of Research, International Monetary Fund
Date and time: Thursday 4 November 2010, 18:30
Venue: Sheikh Zayed Theatre, Lower Ground Floor, New Academic Building, LSE
RESTORING GROWTH
The financial crisis and the great recession dealt the global economy a massive shock.
How can growth be put back on a sustainable path? What policy lessons have we
learned? And how should Britain respond?
Speaker: John Van Reenen, Professor of Economics, LSE, and Director of CEP
Date and time: Tuesday 16 November 2010, 18:30
Venue: Old Theatre, Ground Floor, Old Building, LSE
These events are free and open to all with no ticket required. Entry is on a first come, first
served basis. For any queries email events@lse.ac.uk or call +44 (0)20 7955 6043. 
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